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Abstract 
This article offers a critical reflection on automation of play and its significance for the 
theoretical enquiries into digital games and play. Automation has become an ever more 
noticeable phenomenon in the domain of video games, expressed by self-playing game 
worlds, self-acting characters, and non-human agents traversing multiplayer spaces. On 
the following pages, the author explores various instances of automated non-human play 
and proposes a post-human theoretical lens, which may help to create a new framework 
for the understanding of video games, renegotiate the current theories of interaction 
prevalent in game studies, and rethink the relationship between human players and digital 
games. 
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Automated state of play 
The modern understanding of the term automation (Greek: autómatos, self-moving), 
going back to sixteenth century, denotes a machine with a self-contained principle of 
motion (Truitt 2015: 2). A digital computer, with a motherboard at its heart, is in many 
ways precisely such a machine. Thus, most games, staged within the medium of the 
computer, involve some level of automation, such as calculating gathered props, lost 
lives, or the player’s proximity to an enemy NPC. Unlike in board games, where all such 
computation needs to be done manually by the human player, in a digital game most of 
the processes are automated and hidden from the player’s view. This type of automation 
is well known to an average gamer. What is much more mesmerizing is the sort of 
automation reflected in the representational layer of the game, bringing the ‘aesthetics of 
agency and control (or the loss of these)’ (Giddings 2005) to the forefront. Many recent 
examples I will draw upon on the pages to follow tend to partially or entirely automate 
those parts of gameplay, which are usually performed by humans. Think about 
movement-simulating bots of Pokémon Go, ‘self-acting’ non-human agents or the so-
called non-player characters (NPCs), or game worlds changing independently of the 
human player’s actions in one of Fallout 4 mods. 
Despite this perceived agency, ‘liveliness’ or ‘smartness’ of many ludic systems, 
the understanding of what digital games are and what it means to play them, usually tends 
to fall back on anthropocentric narratives, placing the human player as a necessary central 
component of the agential experience.1 The proverbial state of play in how digital games 
are perceived and defined seems to be revealing a very binary world-view: human versus 
                                                          
1 With a few examples including a contribution on zero-player games by Björk and Juul (2012). 
 
computer, organic versus the inorganic (Haraway [1991] 2000), active versus passive or 
player versus game. 
On the following pages, I would like to propose to rethink digital games and play, 
shying away from the purely anthropocentric perspective according to which humans are 
the active subjects and the game a mouldable object of human desire. It is precisely this 
alleged subject–object boundary that is transgressed in digital game play (Giddings 
2005). After all, video games are actions, not only of the human players but equally so of 
the machines, to emphasize with Galloway (2006). By their very nature, they break down 
the subject–object, organic–inorganic and player–game dichotomies. They constitute 
ludic ensembles, ‘inter-species assemblages’ (Dyer-Witheford 2015) or ‘biological–
technological–informational’ collages (Stasieńko 2017: 44). 
My aim in this introductory article is to reflect video games, looking at such 
paradoxical examples as self-playing games, ‘idling’ or automated gameplay modes.  
I will start with a brief narrative on the fascinating past of automata in order to historicize 
automation of play beyond the digital playgrounds of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. The Mechanical Turk (1770), an android displayed at the courts of Europe, 
will serve here as a point of departure and a bridge in the post-human ludic story told on 
the pages to follow. I will then ‘zoom in’ to a few examples of video games with 
automated gameplay components, and follow up with a post-human theoretical lens, 
which may be helpful in reflecting the phenomenon of play automation in particular, and 
digital gameplay in general. This critical inquiry into automated play is also an attempt to 
offer an alternative to interactivity-centred discourse so prevalent since the beginnings of 
video game studies. 
Self-playing automata of Enlightenment and algorithms of today 
The dreams of devising self-acting or self-playing machines (in a broad understanding of 
the term, also encompassing musical play) are much older than digital computers. They 
may be traced back to Enlightenment (Voskuhl 2013), if not Antiquity (Truitt 2015).2 
Automata and autonomous or semi-autonomous machines, mimicking various actions – 
such as moving, singing, writing or playing – have been the subject of human curiosity 
and artistry for thousands of years. Whether hydraulic, pneumatic, mechanical, electrical 
or digital (de Valk 2016), they lured with a promise to emulate, challenge and ultimately 
excel the human capacity. 
Perhaps the most recognized games-related experiment of this kind in the western 
tradition, points towards the late eighteenth-century invention – The Mechanical Turk, 
also known as the Automaton Chess Player, an anthropomorphic life-sized figure of a 
player, whose mechanical arms were put to motion by a clockwork mechanism. 
Wolfgang von Kempelen, a civil servant and an imperial councillor, embarked upon the 
quest to design the Turk in 1769 in order to impress the Empress of Austria-Hungary, 
Maria Theresa. He did not have much time as other ‘magicians’ visited the court and 
presented their latest experiments on magnetism3 or mechanical writing.4 He completed 
the Chess Player in six months and in 1770 the Turk played its first game against the 
human opponent. At first, the inventor himself allegedly refused to make a fully open 
public exhibition of it, an act that has been ascribed to his true genius indifferent to 
                                                          
2 Automata were already built in Antiquity and described in the treatises of Hero of Alexandria, which 
alluded to self-moving water clocks, automatic theatres and many other self-moving hydraulic wonders 
(Riskin 2003; Truitt 2015: 4). 
3 François Pelletier, an illusionist, allegedly visited the court to present his experiments on magnetism. 
4 The ‘Miracle Writing Machine’ (Allesschreibende Wundermaschine) was built by the German mechanic 
Friedrich von Knaus (1724–89), who presented it in 1760 to the empress Maria Theresa in Vienna. 
popular favour. He even considered dismantling the Automaton to pieces, much like the 
ingenious forger Trurl, a pivotal fictitious figure re-appearing in many short stories by 
Stanislaw Lem. In ‘The Great Spanking’ (1983), Trurl allegedly devised an intelligent 
wish-fulfilling machine, which could make an indistinguishable copy of himself. When 
almost disguised by his opponent as an imposter, Trurl disassembled his own creation to 
pieces, leaving no trace of it but the stories and praising accounts of its existence. Von 
Kempelen decided to keep the Chess Player and kindle the stories of its artisanal genius 
for generations to come. 
The Automaton had been travelling the globe for 84 years, outliving its inventor 
by a few decades and defeating human opponents, amongst them Napoleon Bonaparte, 
Benjamin Franklin and Charles Babbage. In 1819 it reached London’s Spring Gardens, 
where it was publicly exhibited. An anonymous Oxford graduate observer, in a 32-page 
long account of the encounter, described the figure’s apparition and mechanism, and 
questioned the possibility of it displaying the intelligence of a reasoning agent. Not being 
able to find the true source of simulation, he had come to the conclusion that the seeming 
impossibility had indeed been surmounted by the Automaton Chess Player: 
 
To construct an arm and hand capable of performing the ordinary functions of 
those parts, would be of itself sufficient to secure the reputation of an artist; but 
to make the same arm and hand almost counterparts of living members in a 
reasoning agent, displays a power of invention as bold and original, as any that 
has yet been exhibited to the world. 
(Observations on the Automaton Chess Player 1819) 
 
The Turk, as an oriental self-playing figure of a sorcerer placed at a robust wooden desk 
with a chessboard, in addition strengthened the audience’s perception of it as an 
unrevealed mystery foreign to their cultural territory. Already in the medieval period 
‘[] Latin Christians associated automata with Arab, Greek, and Mongol courts and saw 
them […] as the products of foreign knowledge and exotic materials’ (Truitt 2015: 19). In 
the end, The Turk, instead of being a mysteriously devised intelligent machine, turned out 
to be an elaborate hoax; an illusion played upon generations of audiences and chess 
players, defeated not by a machine, but a human skilfully hidden inside the wooden desk 
and operating the mechanical arms. Despite being a disappointment, the Turk 
nevertheless became a symbolic exemplification of dreams of devising intelligent 
machines automating human physical and cognitive processes. It reflected the desire to 
‘[] imitate and expand the human mind, which has been the main project throughout 
the history of mechanization of the mind pursued by many notable figures including 
Pascal, Leibniz, Babbage, Wiener, and Turing’ (Aytes 2011). 
Automata, androids and machines had also become the subjects of many literary 
works of the late eighteenth century and continued to feed the imagination of modern 
science-fiction authors, bringing to life such figures as Frankenstein, among many others. 
The Turk, for instance, became a source of inspiration for a German writer Johann Paul 
Friedrich Richter (later known as Jean Paul), who explored the boundaries between 
humans and machines. In a satirical–philosophical text ‘Humans are machines of the 
angels’ (‘Menschen sind Maschinen der Engel’, 1795) ‘[h]e talks about an angel who 
built chess-playing machines, for the sake of “curiosity and pleasure rather than for 
utility”’ (Voskuhl 2013): 
 Ein Engel verfertigte auch, wiewol mehr der Seltenheit und des Vergnügens als 
des Nuzens wegen, herliche Schachmaschinen [] 
(Richter 1795) 
 
And this crucial polarity between utility and playful curiosity brings me to Google’s 
algorithmic Go player, the most current descendant of the Mechanical Turk. On 9 March 
2016 the algorithm was presented at the Google DeepMind Challenge, a public Go match 
staging a human and a machine, the first event of that kind since the acclaimed 1997 
chess match between Deep Blue and Garry Kasparov. Lee Sedol, the world’s second best 
Go player, also referred to as ‘The Strong Stone’, played against the algorithm devised by 
a group of machine-learning scientists at the Google’s Deep Blue company. After seven 
days, the South Korean grandmaster of Go left the scene defeated by the AlphaGo 4-1. 
AlphaGo is claimed to be a multipurpose general algorithm tested within the 
game’s framework but developed with a broader scope and the aim to become adaptable 
for numerous objectives, able to learn automatically from scratch rather than being pre-
programmed. It has raised human curiosity but is made to be applied rather than merely 
displayed for entertainment. AlphaGo has been learning from the behavioural patterns of 
100.000 amateur human Go players, further replaying itself 30 million times and 
becoming stronger with every iteration (BBC Newsnight 2016). This version of the 
algorithm was a big step in AI simulating human cognitive capacities, able to win a 
game, whose complexity far exceeds chess and is said to have more configurations than 
there are known atoms in the universe. The version, which in 2016 outplayed Lee Sedol, 
the winner of eighteenth 18 t international Go titles, has been recently challenged by an 
even stronger opponent, its second successor algorithm trained by random self-play only, 
this time with no initial human input. AlphaGo Zero beat AlphaGo Lee 100 to 0 
(Deepmind). Google’s team published their findings in Nature, proclaiming AlphaGo 
Zero as an algorithm achieving ‘superhuman performance’ (Silver et al. 2017). This 
statement, even when taken with a pinch of salt, is particularly interesting, taking into 
account the long history of automata, robots and artificial life. Historians of science have 
noticed a continuity of thought (Voskuhl 2013) connecting the automata of Antiquity, 
Middle Ages and Enlightenment (Truitt 2015) with the robots of cybernetic modernity or 
the algorithms of post-modernity, although the first ones were devised in much different 
pre-industrial times and presented to a very distant audience. Google’s latest Go 
experiments bring to mind John von Neumann’s visions of self-reproducing machines 
programmed to build themselves without the need of a human intervention (von 
Neumann 1966). AlphaGo Zero is not a ‘slavish type of machine’ (Cohen 1967: 120–21), 
like chess-playing IBM’s Deep Blue (1997) or Arthur Lee Samuel’s Checkers-Playing 
Program (1959), both of which outplayed their human opponents by sheer force of 
calculation and still required the programmer to lay down the general strategy in advance 
(Cohen 1967: 120–21). AlphaGo and AlphaGo Zero epitomise some of Licklider’s 
(1960) speculations that machines may possibly outdo the human brain and dominate in 
the future. 
But the story of self-playing AlphaGo Zero has also another fascinating 
dimension. The algorithm, once decoupled from learning based on human performance, 
developed its own strategies, differing from all the known moves played by humans in 
the last 2.500 years; thus encouraging human players to see the Go board with new eyes 
and learn from the unusual repertoire of AlphaGo’s moves. 
 
Mods, bots and non-human ludic agents 
To some degree, such a playful post-human engagement between humans and algorithms 
– whether competitive or collaborative – rests at the base of computer games. Due to their 
technological nature, games reflect ‘the distributions and delegations of agency between 
technologies and players in the act of playing’ (Giddings 2005). The current deployment 
of bots and various autoplay modes further amplify the imaginary of non-human 
agentiality. Let us have a look at a few illustrative examples. 
In Sim Settlements (Livingston 2017),5 one of the most recent Fallout 4 (2015) 
mods, NPCs build their own housing, plant their own crops, even work in shops they 
themselves construct. The human player is welcome to the city-building algorithmic 
spectacle as a by-stander and a delegating agent. The NPCs do not need to be 
micromanaged by the player. Instead, they metaphorically take matters in their own 
hands, in a similar way to the delegated gameplay model known from god-simulation 
genres. In this way, the game world acquires a life-like dimension from the perspective of 
the human player. As one of the mod’s users emphasizes: 
 
The buildings your settlers construct aren’t cookie-cutter affairs: they’re all a bit 
different, right down to the clutter that eventually appears inside them. This 
means just about every house and store your NPCs build will look unique. I was 
                                                          
5 Settlements building themselves: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67Dj4m_uj5s.  
oddly pleased to see my companion Curie build herself a home out of a trailer 
rather than a wood or tin shack like everyone else had done. 
(Livingston 2017) 
 
The mod automatically assigns citizen NPCs to plots pre-selected by the player (e.g. 
farming, residential or industrial plots). Automation of gameplay has become a common 
practice in the modding community. A lot of other games come with mods based on 
progressive automation. One of them is Minecraft, in which the player can excavate the 
game’s environment with the help of automatic miners, set up farms that will plant and 
harvest crops, or use crafting machines, which will automatically craft the contents of the 
inventory. 
Within an established genre of massively multiplayer online role-playing games, 
modding has become a debatable practice. Many players tend to use the so-called bots 
and macros (third-party software) to partially automate gameplay, deskill the players (De 
Paoli 2013) and alleviate the repetitiveness of tedious tasks necessary in order to level up 
the characters more efficiently. In most cases the practice is undesired by the game 
developers. Blizzard banns the unfair use of smart bots automating the gameplay of 
World of Warcraft: 
 
We’ve recently taken action against a large number of World of Warcraft 
accounts that were found to be using third-party programs that automate 
gameplay, known as ‘bots.’ We’re committed to providing an equal and fair 
playing field for everyone in World of Warcraft, and will continue to take action 
against those found in violation of our Terms of Use. Cheating of any form will 
not be tolerated. 
(Blizzard’s statement 2015) 
 
A similar reaction has affected gameplay automation enthusiasts in Pokémon Go, a 
multiplayer augmented reality game, in which the players move in the real world in order 
to locate and capture virtual Pokémon creatures, visible on the screens of their mobile 
devices. Some players automate this tedious collection process, by using bots and other 
third-party software to send off alleged GPS locations, while not moving an inch in the 
physical world. Niantic, the game’s developer, has been actively finding ways to 
eliminate this type of subversive gameplay or cheating. Players seem to delegate the act 
of play onto to the algorithms for numerous reasons. For efficiency. For time saving. For 
fun. 
 
Idling and self-playing games 
Gameplay automation has also defined an entire casual game genre. In the so-called 
incremental (‘idle’) games, also referred to as passive, self-playing or clicker games, 
there is minimal active engagement required from the player in order for the game to 
progress.6 The initial stages of most idle games (e.g. AdVenture Capitalist, 2015; Cookie 
Clicker, 2013; Universal Paperclips, 2017) start with the player performing a simple task 
of clicking in order to gain more in-game currency (e.g. logs, coins, cookies, etc.), which 
in turn allows them to acquire items or skills that automate most of the gameplay in the 
                                                          
6 I have discussed self-play within the context of idle games more extensively in the following article: 
‘Interpassivity and the joy of delegated play in idle games’ (Fizek 2018a). 
future. As the game unfolds incrementally, more options emerge and more tasks are 
automated. Idle games are semi-automated ‘ongoing, never-ending affairs’ (Bogost 
2010). 
In other words, in idle games the player’s constant participation is not a necessary 
condition for play to take place. Play emerges as a substitutive act – the player, 
represented by the automatic clicker algorithms, may take absence from the game. In the 
early stages of Cookie Clicker, for instance, one may delegate the cumbersome task of 
cookie production to ‘Cursors’ and ‘Grandmas’. Having earned enough cookie currency, 
the player then may proceed to set up ‘Farms’, ‘Mines’, ‘Temples’ and ‘Wizard Towers’ 
to further multiply the cookie realm. Every now and then, the player comes back to the 
game in order to unlock further upgrades, check statistics and browse through an 
expanding collection of achievements. The random ‘golden cookie’ boost acts as an 
encouragement to come back to the game in order to increase the cookie meter and 
manually click alongside the automatically proceeding gameplay. The game may slow 
down without the human presence, but it will not come to a complete halt. Many players 
flip between the tabs of the Internet browser, constantly going in and out of the game. 
This intermittent interaction pattern, emerging as a result of this sort of delegated play, 
defines the active moments between automated gameplay sessions. The gameplay is 
reversed, as if the ‘load’ screen was the actual game and the gameplay a moment to ‘wind 
up’ or ‘load’ the game. 
 Figure 1: Cookie Clicker (2013) 
 
This play pattern brings to mind the nineteenth-century street barrel organs, 
played by rotating a handle in a cyclical motion, and thus delegating the actual task of 
playing the organs to the ‘programmed’ cylinder. Perhaps on some level, I could risk  
a comparison of the tasks of an idle gamer to those performed by barrel grinders. After 
all, both consist in delegating the otherwise highly absorbing, oftentimes tedious and 
complex activity of play to a machine, which needs to be ‘ground’ from time to time in 
order to keep playing. 
Another fascinating example of automated play may be observed in Everything 
(2017). In David OReilly’s open-ended simulation, the player can do everything and at 
the same time does not have to do anything at all. On the one hand, the game invites the 
player to a sandbox-like exploration of its universe, giving them the possibility to get into 
the shoes of every creature possible: 
 
I am Rock Planet, small and grey. Soon I am Sun, and then I am Lenticular 
Galaxy. Things seem a little too ordinary, so I pull up a menu and transform my 
galaxy into a Woolly Mammoth. With another button I multiply them. I am 
mammoths, in the vacuum of space. 
(Bogost 2017) 
 
On the other, if left unattended, the game starts playing automatically: 
 
One might let Everything play in the background while doing other things, letting 
it be an ambient aquarium of universes. 
(Brewster 2017) 
 
 
Figure 2: Everything (2017) 
 
And finally, Emissaries (2015–17), an obscure art simulation trilogy by a digital 
artist Ian Cheng, described by the author as a video game that plays itself. It was 
originally exhibited in 2017 in MoMA PS1 in New York and simultaneously online on 
the Twitch.tv gaming platform. It is important to remember that Emissaries is not an 
animation (although it may look like one in a museum hallway), but a series of 
simulations rendering live on the screen. ‘The works are comprised of computer-
generated simulations like those used in predictive technologies for complex scenarios 
such as climate change or elections’, we can read on MoMA’s website. To create the 
simulations Cheng used a popular video game development engine Unity, which allowed 
him to programme the physical characteristics of the world. It also contains various types 
of AI assigned to the characters and entities of the world, competing with one another. 
 
 
Figure 3: Emissaries (2017) 
 
All the instances of play mentioned above not only subvert the contemporary 
understanding of games as solely interactive media, but also reformulate the usually 
centric role of the player. When the game plays itself, the performative character of play 
is shifted towards the game itself. In such cases, the game becomes a self-governing 
homeostatic system, a retroactive machine acting and reacting upon itself. 
 
Post-human play: Rethinking anthropocentric rules of the game 
Automation of play, in its manifold variations, has become a visible part of the ludic 
landscape. Players seem to find it quite an astounding experience, especially, if it 
involves representations of human-like figures, who virtually embody the self-acting 
algorithms, producing an illusion of a living agent in a dynamically responding world. 
The fascination with life-like capacities of virtual spaces resounds in the following words 
of the player: 
 
I can’t remember when I first saw AI picking fights with each other [] [but] the 
first time it happened, it was a minor moment of joy. Not because the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend, […] but because it meant the game world wasn’t all 
about me. 
(Rossignol 2012) 
 
The above words expressing a moment of ludic epiphany (‘the game world wasn’t all 
about me’) open a much-needed discussion on the non-player centric perception of digital 
play, and the part of the human player within it. Humans are usually depicted as sole 
meaningful agents, deriving pleasure from control over the game. In most digital games, 
the role of the human player is to actively participate in gameplay, and that of the 
machine to enable, sustain and facilitate play; record its progress and communicate the 
outcome to the player. In many of the examples mentioned above, the human becomes a 
witness to the system’s agency, and a delegator of play onto the algorithms (bots, mods, 
ludic system). 
At a first glimpse, automation of play and self-acting AI seem like problematic 
parts of a puzzling paradox. After all, games have been primarily understood as objects to 
be actively engaged with, conflicts to be resolved and meaningful actions to be taken 
(Huizinga [1938] 1992; Caillois [1958] 2001; Crawford 1982; Juul 2003; Salen and 
Zimmerman 2003). They are supposed to be ergodic, requiring a non-trivial effort from 
their participants, who in turn need to actively interpret the activity as a game for it to be 
considered one (Aarseth 1997; Aarseth and Calleja 2015). If anything else, games have 
been described as inherently interactive (Crawford 1984; Ermi and Mäyrä 2005), and 
oftentimes in contrast to non-interactive or less interactive media such as films or books, 
however problematic such oppositions may be. In other words, most digital games, 
staged in the medium of a computer, could be described as ‘explicitly participational’ 
(Manovich 2001: 71). Of course all the above assumptions are made with regard to 
human players. 
This paradox, however, does not have to express any conflict of interests. It rather 
opens the category of agency towards non-human entities. Control over the game 
becomes an act of negotiation between human players and non-human actors, defining 
what I refer to as post-human play. A post-human (Braidotti 2013; Ferrando 2013, 2018) 
tone resounds also in Alexander Galloway’s early definition of digital games, according 
to which they are not only the actions of human operators but equally so, those of 
machines (Galloway 2006). Even more so, of machines, which do not always act in 
response to human players, but independently of them in the so-called ‘ambience acts’ of 
the machine – the moments when the digital game plays itself while waiting for the 
player to return and continue where they left off (Galloway 2006). As we have seen in a 
variety of examples discussed in the previous sections, the agential dimension of the 
machine becomes an ever more present part of gameplay. Therefore, it is crucial to take a 
closer look at such conceptions of agency, which take into account the interplay between 
the machine and the (human) player (Mukherjee 2008: 235). 
By bringing automation of play into the centre of discussion, I am following in 
the footsteps of non-human dimension of digital play, the subject of an extensive debate 
opened by Seth Giddings a decade ago, when he proposed to recognize technological 
agency and shy away from the anthropocentric assumption that agency resides solely in 
the human (Giddings 2005). Video games as instances of everyday technoculture, as such 
operate within the premises of digitality, technology, simulations and software. The 
digital and networked nature of the computer calls for a decentralized understanding of 
the player as an active agent. Post-humanist thought seems to be offering a promising 
perspective for games research in this respect. The subjectivity of the player is 
redistributed during gameplay into a post-human network of human and non-human 
bodies and agentialities (Stasieńko 2017). The idea of who the player is, is 
simultaneously shaped and expanded by the game itself – it rests between a technological 
interface and a represented fictional world (Keogh 2014). 
It is an eye-opening act to look at the world from the perspective of a thing as Ian 
Bogost notices in Alien Phenomenology (2012). It is equally fascinating, if not necessary 
in order to understand digital play, to move beyond the human and look at the phenomena 
of gaming from the point of view of the game instead (Wark 2009: 223). The very fact 
that games entail AI, procedural generation, complex agential relations between the 
player and the avatar, mean that strict divisions into subject and object, activity and 
passivity need to be rethought. After all, the game’s script is put into motion not only by 
the sheer agency of the human player but also by AI scripts (Stasieńko 2017: 42) and the 
hardware. 
Technology is an inseparable part of being human. It is more than a mere tool to 
achieve goals. This perspective of human–technological interconnectedness, named by 
Katherine Hayles as technogenesis (Hayles 2011), manifests itself in the way digital 
games operate as human–non-human ludic entanglements, embodying the agential role of 
the machine. The digitality of computer games, as I have emphasized with Galloway and 
Giddings amongst others, turns them into almost unquestionable examples of 
technogenesis and post-anthropocentrism (Braidotti 2013). The examples of self-acting 
and self-playing AI, which I have drown upon in the previous section, make the 
technocultural, technogentic and post-human dimensions even more pronounced. It 
seems that digital games by their very nature break down the subject–object, organic–
inorganic and player–game dichotomies. They constitute ludic ensembles, ‘inter-species 
assemblages’ (Dyer-Witheford: 2015) or ‘biological-technological-informational’ 
collages (Stasieńko 2017: 44). 
 
Towards a post-human aesthetic of video games and play 
Automation of play is a growing phenomenon, but most importantly a complex one. It 
goes hand in hand with AI and encompasses a wide range of differing examples, from 
self-learning Go algorithms, self-changing game worlds, bot-driven gameplay to ‘idling’. 
Although all of them highlight a post-human understanding of digital games, they differ 
substantially not only in terms of the specific algorithms used but more importantly in 
terms of varied contexts of their existence, and the place of the human within this post-
human ludic assemblage. 
Some algorithmic actors seem to be a twenty-first-century interpretation and 
continuation of the Enlightenment android motif. Such algorithms are displayed mainly 
for human amusement. Others could be seen as cognates of spinning machines, steam 
engines and punch cards. The practices of autocrafting in Minecraft, botting in 
multiplayer online games, and ‘idling’ – discussed in the previous section – all bring to 
mind the processes of mechanisation of labour and work management. These mods are 
employed by the players for the sake of utility rather than sheer pleasure to emphasize 
with Jean Paul, already mentioned in this article. More future work needs to be 
undertaken on the AI-driven automation aspect in games and virtual environments. How 
do we interact with self-playing systems? Do algorithms play? Can we even talk of a 
game, if it does not involve active human participation? These are just some of the 
daunting questions. 
Perhaps the automation of play marks an arrival of a new kind of aesthetic of 
video games and digital play; one that would see agency and action as qualities 
distributed between humans, AI and hardware. Some important questions arise: how 
should we judge the beauty of an automated game, the perfectly efficient automated 
speed run, the algorithm-inspired new move combination in Go, an incrementally 
growing semi-automated game system? Perhaps a post-human aesthetic could involve a 
combination of procedural artistry of the system and the human spectatorship of it. 
Post-humanism could serve here as a metaphorical angle, a framework of thought, 
which allows to see all the multiplicities of play in digital environments or the so-called 
performative multiplicities (Jayemanne 2017). In other words still, by focusing on the 
automation of play through a post-humanist lens I do not claim a game world with no 
human players or aim to assign meaning and intentionality to an algorithm. Instead, I 
propose to open the video game category to different human–non-human constellations 
of play, human and machine acts, and all the experiments, which may be described as 
post-human play; post-human in the sense of non-dualistic and non-anthropocentric 
(Ferrando 2018). Such a perspective shift would allow us to reinvestigate the subject–
object divide and perhaps think of a post-human aesthetic of video games. 
More importantly, post-human play – most tangible in the case of automated 
gameplay – opens up to many other theoretical perspectives, which have the chance to 
surmount the mantra of interactivity: intra-activity (Barad 2003), interpassivity (Pfaller 
1996, 2008; Žižek 1997) or aesthetics of ambience (Schröter et al. 2018), amongst many 
others. After all, at some point, many concepts and terms in media and games theory 
reach their end, and remain nothing more than empty clichés; interactivity being one of 
them (Zielinski 2014: 238). The term obstructs the full view of the video game and our 
relationship to it, and my aim in this article was to bring to light that which has been 
covered by it. 
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